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Abstract 
Intergovernmental forums facilitate negotiation, non-hierarchical exchange of 
information and cooperation between the institutions of the two levels of 
government. This article explores the experience of the House of Federation, 
the Ministry of Federal Affairs and sector by sector harmonization in two 
federal Ministries and their respective regional bureaus. There is lack of an 
independent institution in charge of consolidating inter-governmental relation 
(IGR) and this in turn has led to gaps in the regularity, continuity and 
effectiveness of the interactions. Save for some provisions of the Constitution 
dictating non-hierarchal relationship between the federal and regional states, 
the Ethiopian federation is generally characterized by a top-down relationship 
which can erode the spirit of partnership.  Establishing an appropriate legal 
framework is thus essential to optimize the role of IGR in the Ethiopian federal 
system. The House of Federation seems the appropriate institution to organize 
IGR, and if the current dependence on the executive line remains unchanged, 
the focal point for IGR should be the Prime Minister’s Office owing to its 
enhanced opportunity to give binding decisions and its ability to control the 
execution of decisions. Excessive reliance on political party lines evokes the 
question as to what will happen if opposing parties manage to win elections at 
federal and regional levels, and whether under such settings the collapse of the 
Soviet Union could be a prophesy to the Ethiopian federalism as well.  Such 
risks call for stable and formal legal and institutional frameworks of IGR 
toward harnessing centrifugal forces and nurturing unity within diversity.  
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Introduction 
IGR focuses on how different orders of government in federal political systems 
communicate and collaborate with each other. It encompasses the entire 
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complex and interdependent relations among various spheres of government in 
legal, financial and administrative matters and policy coordination. There are 
various types of political arrangements or structural political organizations with 
varying degrees of relevance and utility.1 An effective structure in a political 
organization is conceived as the bedrock on which the state is erected.2 It is also 
described as an indispensable determinant of administrative efficiency in any 
state. One of such structural political organizations which have weathered the 
test of time is federalism.3 The idea of federalism presupposes the existence of 
tiers of government with defined competence and dominion of jurisdiction on 
the same land.4 Powers and functions of each government are outlined as part of 
the division of power and their sovereignty is also maintained. However, it does 
not necessarily mean that the division of powers and functions between the 
central government and constituent units remains fixed on permanent basis.  It 
rather involves a continuous process of political bargaining between the centre 
and the federation units.5  To this end, the synergy among the different levels of 
government needs to be backed by well-designed and institutionalized 
intergovernmental relations.6 IGR is a vital norm and continues as a widely 
shared and one of the most common characteristic of any federation.7 It 
regulates and enhances communication between the institutions of the two levels 
of government that have defined jurisdictions and are supreme within their 
respective powers.  
IGR focuses on how different orders of government in federal political 
systems communicate and collaborate with each other. It encompasses the entire 
complex and interdependent relations among various spheres of government 
with respect to co-ordination of public policies.8 IGR as a concept is commonly 
                                           
1 S.T. Akindele  & O. R. Opaopa  (2003). ‘The Theory and Practice of Federalism as a 
Structural Mechanism of Governance: How Adequate for Gender Struggle and 
Representation in Nigeria?’,  Kamla-Raj, Anthropologist Journal, Volume  5, No. 3: 169-
178,  p 170.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Solomon Negussie (2008). Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic-based Federal 
System, Revised Edition, Wolf Legal Publishers, Oisterwijk, p.32. 
5 Berhanu Gutema (2007).  Restructuring State and Society: Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia, 
SPIRIT PhD Series, Thesis no. 8 published by SPIRIT & Department of Culture and 
Global Studies  p.29.  
6 Mitullah Winnie V. (2012). ‘Intergovernmental Relations Act 2012: Reflection and 
Proposals on Principles, Opportunities and Gaps’, FES Kenya Occasional Paper, No. 6, p. 
4.  
7 Meekison J. Peter  (2000).  Introduction, in the Meekison J. Peter, ed., on 
“Intergovernmental relations in Federal countries: A series of Essays on the practice of 
Federal Governance”,   p1.  
8 Mitullah Winnie V., supra note 6, p 5. 
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used to refer to relations between and within levels of government that facilitate 
the attainment of common goals through cooperation and interactions.9 These 
relations and interactions occur through policy alignment, reporting 
requirements, fiscal grants and transfers, the planning and budget as well as 
informal knowledge sharing and communication among officials.10 With this in 
mind, establishment of permanent forums of intergovernmental bond has crucial 
roles in negotiation, non-hierarchical exchange of information as well as 
facilitation of cooperation between the institutions of the two levels of 
governments.11 This eventually will bring mutual respect and confidence 
between the various levels of government.12  
It may be argued that intergovernmental cooperation is both an inevitable and 
desirable feature of federal political systems. Given the importance of IGR in a 
federal system in enhancing negotiation, maintaining non-hierarchical exchange 
of information as well as facilitation of cooperation, an important question 
facing many federations is the extent to which modern constitutions should 
recognize and regulate intergovernmental interaction.13 In many federations, 
there are intergovernmental councils, commissions, and committees,14 and their 
interaction depends on the type of federation and subject matter. 
In Ethiopia, the Constitution provides for a dual governmental structure 
along with separate jurisdiction to each level of government.15 Although the 
jurisdictions of the federal government and the member states are distinctly 
delineated, there are important constitutional provisions that underline the need 
for consultation, coordination and collaboration. It is possible to argue that the 
federal government and the constituent units are interdependent in a wide range 
of matters. The preamble of the FDRE Constitution emphasizes the need to 
form, “one economic community…with sustainable and mutually supportive 
conditions …”16 In the first dimension of the functional interface between the 
two levels of government, the federal government is authorized to formulate and 
implement the overall social, economic and development policies and strategies 
of the Country, while the jurisdiction of the regional governments is limited to 
                                           
9 Ibid  
10 Ibid  
11 Assefa Fiseha (2009).  ‘The system of Intergovernmental relationship (IGR) in Ethiopia: 
in search of institution and Guidelines’, Journal of Ethiopia law, vol. 23 No.1 PP 96-131 
pp. 107-108.  
12 Ibid, p 108. 
13 Patz, Tom (2005). ‘Ethiopia’, in Ann Griffith (ed.), Handbook of federal countries. 
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.  
14 Watts, R. (2001). Comparing Federal Systems. 2nd ed. Montreal and Kingston: School of 
Policy Studies - Queen’s University.  
15 See article 50(2) of the FDRE Constitution.  
16 See the preamble of the FDRE Constitution.  
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preparing social, economic and development policies and strategies that are 
going to be implemented in their specific regions.17 
The second dimension relates to matters of education, health, science, 
technology, protection of cultural and historical legacies. In these matters, the 
federal government sets the national standards and basic policies, while the 
regional states are the conduits for the protection and promotion of the language, 
culture and history of their respective constituent ethnic communities.18 Third, 
while the federal government is responsible to enact laws for the utilization and 
conservation of land and other natural resources,19 the administration of such 
laws is left for the regional states.20 Fourth, the judicial authority of the federal 
High Court and First-Instance Court is delegated to state Supreme Court and 
High Court respectively.21 Fifth, although each level of government is, in 
principle, assigned executive authority for which it has exclusive legislative 
power, federal laws are, in practice, largely executed through the regional states. 
Perhaps more importantly, extensive interaction is envisaged in the fiscal 
domain which involves sharing of revenue, provisions of grants and loans, and 
the auditing and proper utilization of grants allocated to the regions.22 
In spite of the wide range of affairs which require continuous synergy among 
the federal and regional state governments, there are hardly enough provisions 
in the Constitution to regulate IGR.23 The Constitution seems to have loopholes 
in terms of offering sufficient provisions for intergovernmental cooperation. 
Even the existing rudimentary provisions remain largely unimplemented.24 
Other laws and political parties have also failed to create sufficient permanent 
institutional mechanisms to deal with intergovernmental issues. Hence, IGR is a 
notion which is given relatively little attention. This study, therefore, explores 
the current IGR framework in Ethiopia, including policies and structural 
mechanisms with a view to determine the extent to which these have been 
anchored.  
There are two sets of intergovernmental relation –vertical and horizontal.25 
The vertical relation focuses on the relation between the federal government and 
                                           
17 See article 51(2) cum 52(2)(c) of the FDRE Constitution.  
18 See article 51(3)  of the FDRE Constitution. 
19 See article 55(2) (a) of the FDRE Constitution. 
20 See article 52(2)(d) of the FDRE Constitution. 
21 See article 78(2) of the FDRE Constitution. 
22 Solomon Negussie, supra note 4, p 98. 
23 Ibid, p 108. 
24 Ibid. 
25 David Cameron (1999).  Structure of Intergovernmental Relationship a paper presented at 
the International conference on Federalism, Mont-Tremblant, October 1999, Background 
paper, p. 1. 
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constituent units or between constituent units and local governments, whereas 
the horizontal relation involves inter-state or inter-local relations.26 This article 
examines the practices of federal-state intergovernmental relationship in 
Ethiopia. The institutions which are presented in this article were purposely 
selected for investigation on the basis of their relative importance and 
accessibility and their experience in serving as a focal point for the 
intergovernmental relation. Institutions that have relatively wider common 
matters in relation to other institutions were preferred. In this regard, four 
federal level institutions and two institutions from regional governments are 
selected for investigation. Their experience with regard to organizing 
intergovernmental relation has been examined. 
The first section of this article offers a conceptual overview of IGR and 
highlights the theoretical foundations of intergovernmental relationships. 
Section two, discusses the necessity of intergovernmental collaboration within a 
federal system. The third section deals with models of intergovernmental 
relationships and briefly addresses the nature and features of dual and executive 
models of intergovernmental relations. Section 4 highlights the mechanism of 
organizing and institutionalizing intergovernmental relationship in a given 
federal political system. The fifth section briefly explores IGR in Ethiopia and 
its development following the enactment of the FDRE Constitution. It also 
presents the institutional framework of IGR and its implication on the autonomy 
of the states.  
1. Conceptual Overview of IGR  
Intergovernmental relations are of growing concern among governments and 
political scientists27 as they are ubiquitous and pervasive in all federal systems. 
This emanates from the inevitable facts of interdependence among levels of 
governments; complexities of the contemporary policy agenda; and the 
impossibility of drawing clear and separate lines of responsibility among tiers of 
government.28 It may be argued that intergovernmental relations are not about 
neatly defining and defending areas of competency but rather about co-operation 
between organs of the state in different spheres of government.29  
                                           
26 Deil S. Wright (1974).   ‘Intergovernmental Relations: An Analytical Overview’, Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 416, Intergovernmental 
Relations in America Today (Nov., 1974), pp. 1-16 p. 2. 
27 Pattison Mark (1980). ‘Intergovernmental Relations and the Limitations of Central 
Control: Reconstructing the Politics of Comprehensive Education’, Oxford Review of 
Education, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 63-89, p. 64.  
28 George Anderson (2008).  Federalism: An Introduction, Oxford University Press. p. 59. 
29 Department of Provincial and Local Government (the dplg)  Practitioner’s Guide to 
Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa, Website: www.dplg.gov.za 
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According to Watts, “Intergovernmental relations are conventionally defined 
as interaction between governmental units of all types and levels within a 
political system”.30 The wording “all types” signifies the existence of formal and 
informal IGR. The informal aspect of IGR results from the exchange of 
information either by letter, telephone or other similar means.31 On the other 
hand, formal IGR is established by the Constitution, subsequent laws or by 
intergovernmental convention.32 While informal processes involve direct 
communication between functionaries of different levels of governments, the 
formal institutions and processes are in the form of meetings, conventions, or 
conferences involving legislators, ministers, officials, and departments of 
different ministries of federal functionaries. 
The words “all levels” imply “top down or bottom up relationship”, or they 
may refer to collateral relationship among the constituent units. This involves 
two sets of relationships –vertical and horizontal 33 The vertical relation can be 
the relation between the federal government and constituent units or between 
constituent units and local governments. The horizontal relation, as stated 
above, involves inter-state or inter-local relations.34 It is important to note that 
such relationship becomes inevitable in areas which involve concurrent power 
or policy framework on shared programs between the federal government and 
the regions.35 Coordination of polices on shared programs is thus one of the 
factors which necessitate intergovernmental cooperation within a given federal 
system.  
2. The Rationale for Intergovernmental Relations 
The establishment of permanent forums of intergovernmental bond plays a 
crucial role in negotiation, non-hierarchical exchange of information as well as 
facilitation of cooperation between the institutions of the two levels of 
government.36 This will bring mutual respect and confidence between the levels 
of government. There could be various factors that render cooperation as well as 
coordination between or among the tiers of government37 indispensable.   
First, the difficulty of giving clear-cut jurisdiction for each level of 
government renders IGR necessary because “it is impossible to have a 
                                           
30 Watts, R., supra note 14, p. 22.  
31 Id., p. 29. 
32 Id., p. 30 
33 David Cameron., supra note 25, p. 1. 
34 Deil S. Wright (1974), supra note 26, pp. 1-16 p. 2.  
35 Assefa Fiseha (2006). Federalism and the accommodation of diversity in Ethiopia: A 
Comparative Study. (Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publisher) p. 333.  
36 Watts, R, supra note 14, p. 22. 
37 Ibid.  
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watertight distribution of administrative or legislative jurisdiction among 
governments or to avoid overlaps of function”.38 Shared programs are 
inevitable, and intergovernmental cooperation is one of the mechanisms of 
mitigating conflict in the course of such programs. In this respect, Steytler 
argues that “conflict between tiers of states may be inevitable because they 
would often compete for the same powers and resources. Where such conflict 
occurs, they should be settled in the spirit of [cooperation]”.39 In this sense, IGR 
mechanisms are viewed as instruments that facilitate negotiation on matters that 
involve disagreement. Such interaction creates mutual understanding between 
the federal and regional governments.   
Second, intergovernmental relation can serve as “a means to adapt changing 
circumstances without having to resort to formal constitutional amendments”.40  
There is principle of co-operation implied from the concept of federalism that 
could overcome gaps in power distributions. The aim of intergovernmental 
relation is to make adjustment in the existing constitutional distribution of 
power rather than going through a rigorous constitutional amendment process, 
especially where the formal constitutional amendment procedures are rigid and 
unworkable.41 
Third, having effective and efficient intergovernmental relation will help to 
achieve, inter alia, policy coordination, consultation, sharing of experience 
between the tiers of governments and among states/units/regions.42 In a nutshell, 
most federal systems have developed some kind of informal and formal 
structural processes to coordinate and facilitate inter-governmental relations.43 
Although these are the potential explanations that demand intergovernmental 
relation to be rooted within the federal system, their type is influenced by the 
models of IGR.   
3. Models of Intergovernmental Relation 
A federal system usually requires a combination of two orders of government 
that are competent and autonomous in their respective spheres and have 
concurrent powers which can be exercised jointly. Here, what is important is 
                                           
38 Ibid  
39 Steytler Nico (2005). ‘Republic of South Africa’, in John Kincaid and G. Alan, eds., 
Institutional Organs, Structure and Change in Federal Democracies. Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queens university press, p. 176. 
40 Watts, R, supra note 14, p. 26. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Carolyn M. Johns, Patricia L. O‘Reilly, Gregory J. lnwood (2007).  ‘Formal and informal 
dimensions of intergovernmental administrative relations in Canada’, Canadian Public 
Administration Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 21-41, p. 33. 
43 Ibid.  
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how these tiers of government, which are coequal and autonomous, cooperate in 
order to improve the federal practice of the country, especially in the area of 
shared functions. In this respect, there are two models that deal with 
intergovernmental relations in a federal structure.  
3.1 Dual/Competitive Model  
The older federations were born in an era of limited government; hence their 
founders saw little need for formal mechanisms to manage interdependence.44 
For that matter, they did not anticipate the overlapping of power and 
interdependence between the central government and member units of the 
federation. In effect, they did not build formal intergovernmental arrangements 
into their constitutional systems.45 This model focused on separate or divided 
model of federalism, in which, each government would be responsible for both 
lawmaking and the implementation of a defined list of responsibilities.46 The 
foundation of this model is the accountability of each executive to its own 
legislature.  
This model mainly focuses on the existence of inherent competition between 
the levels of government. According to Richard, “the characteristic of the 
competitive model is that it assumes the existence of inherent competition for 
power between the federal and state governments and one can give power only 
at the expense of the other.”47  
The emphasis of this model rests on the competition of the levels of 
government leaving no room for a pattern of political integration between them. 
According to this line of argument, state power should be divided between the 
two tiers of government so that each of them operates independently; this 
denotes a spirit of competition and rivalry between the center and the region.48 
Consequently, intergovernmental relations among the levels of government are 
likely to be minimal.  
This does not however mean that the constitutions of the adherents of this 
model are utterly silent on some critical issues of intergovernmental 
relationship. In an era of complex, all pervasive governance, interdependence 
and overlapping functions grow exponentially, with the attendant risks of 
contradiction and duplication, requiring the development of extensive 
                                           
44 Simeon Richard. (2000). ‘Conclusion’ in the Meekison J peter, ed., on “Intergovernmental 
relations in Federal countries: A series of Essays on the practice of Federal Governance”   
p. 92.  
45 Ibid 
46 Solomon Negussie, supra note 4, p. 38. 
47Assefa Fiseha (2006), supra note 35, p. 369. 
48 Solomon Negussie, supra note 4, p.38. 
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mechanisms of intergovernmental relations.49 Even if there are such types of 
constitutional framework, in practice, the various levels of government in a 
federation have frequent interactions in legal, financial and administrative 
matters.50 This shows that interaction between the levels of government is 
unavoidable.  
3.2 Executive/ Cooperative Model 
This model is in sharp contrast to the dual federalism. It can be described as a 
“shared” or “integrated” federalism, and emphasizes not only on distinct status 
and roles of the different orders of government, but it also gives due attention to 
their collective responsibility in legislation, implementation51 and other avenues. 
The experience of federations throughout the world indicate that it is neither 
possible nor –in some cases– desirable for member governments in a federal 
polity to exercise their powers entirely in isolation from each other.52 It is 
understandable that the distribution of power in a federal system is not based on 
the assumption that the subject of government activity is isolated from each 
other. However, if there are matters that are specifically given to different levels 
of government and where they need to be regulated by different and competing 
orders of government, each tier of government carries out its functions 
independently. Conversely, if a given function needs joint arms of both levels of 
government, they can work together. 
This cooperative model suggests that federal and state governments do not 
operate in isolation as portrayed by the competitive model but rather they 
interact frequently. In this regard, it is pointed out that: 
… [T]he interdependence/overlapping model gives emphasis to the 
existence of shared power and responsibilities among the different levels 
of government. In a nutshell, it states that many areas of policy require 
federal, state and local involvement; that in modern federal system, the 
areas of autonomy and discretion for any single jurisdiction are limited; 
that several levels of government require more bargaining and negotiation 
than competition to obtain adequate power influence to carry out 
programs.53 
                                           
49 Simeon Richard, supra note 44, p. 92. 
50 Solomon Negussie, supra note 4, p. 38. 
51 Simeon Richard: supra note 44,  p. 92. 
52 Saunders Cheryl. (2003). Formal and Informal Institutions and Mechanisms of 
Intergovernmental Relations in Australia, a paper presented on Mechanisms of 
Intergovernmental Relations: International Experiences and Challenges for Brazil  from 
17 and 18 September 2003, Brazil , p. 1.  
53 Assefa Fiseha (2006), supra note 35, p. 369. 
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In this context, federal-state relationship has been considered as the important 
aspect of the federal system. Intergovernmental relation, in effect, is regarded as 
a basic pillar of cooperation that permeates the federal arrangement and that is 
used as an instrument to facilitate compromise if conflict arises out of various 
interests. This model requires the constitution or legislation to spell out for the 
establishment of IGR institutions and set rules that govern how these institutions 
will operate in order to manage intergovernmental collaboration. The structural 
arrangement of this model may vary from federation to federation.  
4. Structure of Intergovernmental Relation  
Co-operation in a federation is not an unqualified good, irrespective of the 
subject and form. In any federation, therefore, there are questions about when 
co-operation is appropriate and in what form.54 There are many ways by which 
one can describe, organize, and institutionalize intergovernmental relations. The 
following dimensions are intended to capture the major aspects of such 
variations.55 
4.1 Arrangements of intergovernmental relation  
The mechanism of intergovernmental relationship varies from one political 
system to another across federations.56 This variation may be attributable to 
various factors. One may find a formal institution which is established either by 
the constitution itself or by a subsequent proclamation. Such law is expected to 
contain detailed rules on how this institution works, including the character and 
major coordination area in which the institution focuses.  
The formal rules of intergovernmental relations are imperative to constrain 
clientelism and destructive behaviour during the IGR dialogue.57 Moreover, 
these laws encompass the role of both the federal and constituent states in IGR. 
The laws indicate the area of competence at both levels of government to 
negotiate and define how IGR institutions function. One of the cardinal reasons 
for formalizing IGR lies on the benefit that “Institutionalisation brings 
                                           
54 Saunders Cheryl, supra note 52, p. 2.   
55 Simeon Richard, supra note 44, p. 91.  
56 Peter Söderlund. (2005). The Dynamics of Federalism in Russia: A Study of Formal and 
Informal Power Resources of the Regional Chief Executives in Russian center-region 
Relations, Åbo Akademi University Press, Finland,  p. 14.  
57 Kincaid John (2000). Intergovernmental relations in the United States of America, in the 
Meekison J.  Peter, Ed. on “Intergovernmental relations in Federal countries: A series of 
Essays on the practice of Federal Governance” p. 33.  
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continuity, stability and predictability. Formal functioning mechanisms allow 
for clear cut action enabling smoother functioning.”58 
Notwithstanding these benefits of formal IGR, there are informal 
intergovernmental relation mechanisms, especially, in those federations whose 
constitutions do not provide ample provision that regulates intergovernmental 
matters. Informal IGR, in most cases, may not have “constitutional base”, but it 
emerges through practice or evolves over time. The practice shapes the overall 
structure and character of IGR. Of course, constitutions may incidentally 
indicate the areas where the federal and the regional governments can work 
together in general or the sector by sector cooperation in particular. However, in 
the absence of an institution which is dedicated to IGR, it is clearly felt that 
intergovernmental interaction between different levels is not a regular affair. 
The informal ways of IGR are fluid and ad hoc that may develop in line with 
changing circumstances and existing political turmoil; and in effect, due 
attention should be given to formal IGR.  
4.2 Balance of power among governments in the IGR forums 
The concept of federalism is based on the idea of partnership which presupposes 
the political actors of the federal and state governments to act and discuss their 
issues on coequal terms. By logical extension we may conclude that IGR 
circumvents hierarchical relation between the center and regional governments. 
In this regard, Assefa considers “the idea of negotiation as an inherent aspect of 
the IGR process and structure” and he notes that “the process should not be 
based on the dictates of one level of government over the other, but should have 
some elements of bargaining and negotiation”.59 In principle, the predominant 
impression is one of relative equality between the two orders of government.  
Unless federal and state governments interact on coequal terms and spirit of 
partnership, the federal political union which has been developed through series 
of negotiation would be defeated. Hierarchy and inequality are likely to lead to 
very different dynamics. The idea of non-hierarchal relationship and the spirit of 
partnership would make clear in advance number of issues such as the 
mechanism of bringing the political acts of the federal and regional states to the 
round table discussion and the manner in which the agenda is set. Whether 
regional states can request the federal government for negotiation would also be 
clearly stipulated including issues such as who would chair such a negotiation 
and, how the institutions should be composed of.   
                                           
58 Ofilia Saavedra & K. K. Kailash (2002). What are Effective Approaches to 
Intergovernmental Relations?  A paper presented at 4th International Conference on 
Federalism: Unity in Diversity Young Professionals, April 22, 2002.  p 8.  
59 Assefa Fiseha (2009), supra note 11, p. 115. 
352                               MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 9, No.2                              December 2015  
 
 
4.3 Intergovernmental institutions as decision-making bodies 
The formal approach of intergovernmental relations presupposes the 
establishment of one or more institutions in charge of regulating the matter. The 
establishment of these institutions requires defining their mandates and decision 
making competences.60 Intergovernmental deliberations primarily involve 
exchanging information and ideas; and they provide a forum for discussion.61 
On the one hand, intergovernmental institutions are mandated to process 
bargaining, negotiation, and persuasion between levels of government, while 
both levels of government remain responsible to their own legislatures and 
electorates for the actions they take.62 At the other extreme, there are 
intergovernmental institutions that can make formal decisions, binding on all the 
partners.63 
There is strong resistance against the assignment of binding powers to non-
elected intergovernmental bodies. This is because accountability of governments 
to each other would potentially undermine the accountability of each levels of 
government to its legislature. In integrated federations, on the other hand, where 
homogeneity and consistency are highly valued, binding intergovernmental 
agreements are the norm.64 
4.4 Focal point for institutional design 
The institutional design of IGR lies in the broader institutional structure or 
framework, within which federalism and IGR are embedded. Be it formal or 
informal, it must indicate the place where this institution should be attached.65 
The institutional design should answer the following queries. Should 
intergovernmental relationships be based on the executive line or other non-
governmental institutions? Where should the focal point be? Does it need to be 
an independent institution or should it be attached to another federal institution?  
Indicating the place where the institution is situated is vital. This perhaps 
guarantees easy enforceability of the decisions. Normally, intergovernmental 
relations take the form of relationship between the executives of the two orders 
of government.66 This implies that intergovernmental relation can be facilitated 
through different channels, structure and processes.67 Party channel is one of 
them. For such a situation to exist there must be one effectively organized and 
                                           
60 Ibid,  p.107, 
61 Simeon Richard,  supra note 44, 99, 
62 Ibid,  
63 Ibid, 
64 Ibid,  
65 Assefa Fiseha, (2009), supra note 11, p 111 
66 Ibid , p 108 
67 Watts, R. (2001), supra note 14, p. 23 
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highly disciplined party that controls all levels of government: both at federal 
and regional levels.68 With an integrated party system in which national parties 
are able to win support across all or most regions, and in which national and 
provincial/state parties are closely linked, with considerable mobility of 
leadership from one level to another, much of the accommodation between the 
center and regions will take place in the course of party politics and in the 
national political arena.69  
5. Party System versus Intergovernmental Relations 
In full-fledged democracies, political parties compete to assume state power. 
The structure of political parties, and their internal practices, policies and pattern 
of interaction can affect the workings of federations.70 These factors can have a 
profound impact upon the functioning of federations. For instance, centralized 
parties tend to centralize political power and decision-making and may create 
trends against the division of power in federations.71 By the same token, if 
splintered parties rule the regional states or if region-based parties are very 
strong, it poses a challenge in the management of a federation.72 
As William Riker notes, “the structure of the system of political parties is 
what encourages or discourages the maintenance of the federal bargaining”.73 
The implication of this argument is that different forms of intergovernmental 
interactions may be desirable depending on the political structure of the country. 
This is not without reason; the experience of intergovernmental relations in 
various federal systems points to the existence of a great variety of 
arrangements. Thus the argument is that, intergovernmental relations can be 
facilitated through different channels, structure and processes.74 Party system 
and party channel among other things, are among the various mechanisms. For 
such a situation to exist there must be one effectively organized and highly 
disciplined party that controls all levels of government: both at federal and the 
regions.75  
The nature of political parties and their internal working procedures has an 
impact on the working of a federation. If one homogeneous party controls both 
                                           
68 Assefa Fiseha (2006), supra note 35, p. 369. 
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levels of government, there would be no occasion for intergovernmental 
conflicts.76 But, in majority of the federations, it is usually unlikely that there 
would be one party dominating both levels of government for a long period of 
time. On the other hand, if diverse parties are in control of the different levels, 
we can expect high level of intergovernmental conflicts and competition.  
6. Intergovernmental Relationship in Ethiopia: Institutional 
Framework and its Implication on State Autonomy 
The FDRE Constitution requires both tiers of government to preserve and 
maintain constitutional order throughout the federation.77 Despite this major 
concurrent constitutional responsibility of the federal and regional states, the 
Constitution contains no explicit reference to intergovernmental cooperation and 
it does not expressly state the obligations of the respective levels of government 
in maintaining the constitutional order. There was thus the statutory gap in 
intergovernmental relations and statutory institutions were not established with 
an explicit aim of facilitating the cooperation.  
In practice, however, various informal intergovernmental forums were 
established in the Ethiopian federation after the enactment of the Constitution. 
These forums are principally aimed at paving the way for cooperation and 
integration between the levels of government. Although meetings were taking 
place between the federal ministerial offices and regional bureaus, between 
director generals and technical experts; between regional governments and local 
governments with their respective offices or sectors, they were largely ad hoc, 
spontaneous, irregular and often without clear constitutional base.78  
In federations with parliamentary systems where the predominant role of 
governmental executives in intergovernmental relations are visible, the 
institutions and processes for intergovernmental relations usually develop 
pragmatically rather than by constitutional requirement.79 In Ethiopia too, the 
institutions and processes for intergovernmental relations have been more or less 
similar to federations with parliamentary systems.80 They involve direct 
communications (via letters or telephone conversations) between the concerned 
functionaries of federal and regional governments.  The various ministries of the 
federal government have direct and close contact with their corresponding 
bureaus in regional governments. This close link and interdependence is 
imperative to carry out their respective responsibilities effectively and in a 
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coordinated manner. It also enhances the capacity of the regional governmental 
institutions, which compared to the federal government institutions, suffer from 
lack of adequate human and material resources. For instance, the Federal 
Ministry of Health and the regional health bureaus work together in a mutually 
complementary manner in the effort to implement the federal health policies and 
standards in regional states.81 The Ministry also provides technical assistance to 
the regional health bureaus. 
We can also identify other ad hoc mechanisms of intergovernmental relations 
in Ethiopia. These include conferences, advisory ad hoc bodies, exchange of 
personal and technical experts, or personal exchange of information between 
authorities of the levels of governments.82 These interactions reveal the 
inevitability of intergovernmental relations between the federal and regional 
governments so as to ensure smooth and efficient application of powers and 
responsibilities. Yet there is the need to look into the institutional framework 
that has been practiced in Ethiopia along with its implications on the autonomy 
of regional states.  
6.1 Institutional framework of intergovernmental relationship in 
Ethiopia   
Usually the mechanisms and structures to carry out IGR functions are the result 
of both formal and informal arrangements. However, structures may be 
determined, at least in part, by constitutions, legislation and other more formal 
agreements. National constitutions often specify revenue and expenditure 
assignments, but they do not institutionalize elements of intergovernmental 
machinery, though some countries have extensive constitutional inter-
governmental provisions.83 Usually, federations manage their intergovernmental 
relations with less explicit guidance rather than express stipulations in the 
constitution.84 It is through legislation that IGR mechanisms are established and 
regulated. This means, the legislator passes bills to formalize inter-governmental 
institutions. Such bills commonly include rules of procedure or the 
establishment of committees to manage intergovernmental matters or provide 
advice about them.  
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In the absence of legislation, intergovernmental agreements, which typically 
are used to implement policy decisions, may also be used to establish inter-
governmental arrangements for the performance of a variety of functions. These 
include consultation on identifying issues; preparation of common policy option; 
coordination, administration, and monitoring of issues; and the establishment of 
rules of procedure. This agreement may also establish forums which enable an 
intergovernmental political body or a group of officials to carry out IGR on 
either a one-time, regular and continuing basis.85 
In light of the discussion above, institutions that are authorized to organize 
intergovernmental relationship seem imprecise in Ethiopia. However, there are 
formal and informal intergovernmental relationships which have been developed 
through time. There is an institution, the House of Federation, which invokes 
constitutional inference to organize IGR.86 At the same time there is also an 
institution –the Ministry of Federal Affairs– that makes reference to legislation 
to organize IGR and establish intergovernmental department within its internal 
structure.87 The third category of institutions that have organized 
intergovernmental relations have made the intergovernmental convention as a 
legal base to organize IGR.88 This is usually described as a sector by sector 
interaction which is backed by memorandum of understanding duly signed by 
both levels of government representatives. This document serves as a legal basis 
to make their interaction formal.  
6.1.1 House of Federation  
The House of Federation is responsible to find solutions to disputes or 
misunderstandings that may arise between regional states.89 For instance, if a 
border dispute arises between two or more states; it is the mandate of the House 
to organize a forum for disputant-states to negotiate and settle the issue 
amicably.90 The House facilitates such forums and umpires both sides to get the 
issues resolved. If this attempt fails, the House can render decision to resolve 
such disputes on the basis of settlement patterns and the wishes of the peoples 
concerned91 within the time frame laid down under the Constitution.92 
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The House is also empowered to decide on issues pertaining to the rights of 
nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination, including the right to 
secession in accordance with provisions of the Constitution.93 This mandate 
demands that regional states which have a problem of misunderstanding with 
one another in dealing with their matter before the House, decide their issues in 
accordance with the Constitution. The House may organize a forum for 
disputant-states to negotiate and resolve the issue amiably. This negotiation may 
include efforts of persuading the parties to renounce their intention of secession. 
The other power of the House which involves intergovernmental relation 
relates to revenue sharing and grant allocations. The House is empowered to 
decide the division of revenues derived from joint Federal and State tax sources 
and the subsidies that the Federal Government may provide to the States.94 It 
decides the share of each level of government from joint tax source, and 
allocates the share of the regional states among individual regional states. The 
House also determines the allocation of federal subsidy among regional states. 
These matters can be source of conflict, and should be decided by consensus to 
maintain the social cohesion among the member states of the federation.  
The House has organized both formal and informal IGR systems. The formal 
forums are essentially of two kinds: ‘Forum of Speakers’ and a joint forum of 
‘federation and regional states’.95 In the former case, as the name indicates, the 
participants are the speakers of both the federal houses and regional state 
councils.96 On the latter forum, the participants of the meeting are not limited to 
representatives of the regional states and the federal governments.97 It includes 
other stakeholders such as different staff, intellectuals and other invited guests. 
The most unique feature of their participation is that the invited guests are not 
passive participants of the meeting. They can forward their views during the 
meeting like any ‘legitimate’ participant or permanent member of the forum. 
The federation units are expected to attend the IGR forum whether the 
agenda concerns a given state or not. This seems to have the rationale that units 
of the federation can draw lessons from states which have encountered 
problems. Most of these conferences are chaired by federal government 
officials. The regional states participate on the agenda set up by the House. The 
                                                                                                            
92 See article 48(2) of the FDRE Constitution. 
93 See article 62 (3) of the FDRE Constitution. 
94 See article 62(7) of the FDRE Constitution. 
95 Interview with Ato Yakob Bekele, Acting Director of Intergovernmental Relations 
Directorate at the House of Federation, Addis Ababa, Feb. 17/2014. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
358                               MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 9, No.2                              December 2015  
 
 
role of the states is limited to forwarding their reflections on each agendum 
designed by experts.98 
However, the IGR forums organized by the House, seem ‘general meetings’ 
rather than an IGR forums. Theses forums set broad agenda. The chairperson 
attempts to narrow down the diverse points raised by the participants. And then, 
the chairperson identifies an agendum that is agreed by all and makes the floor 
open for further discussion on those issues in which the participants did not 
reach agreement.99 These meetings allow differences to be discussed and 
provide a platform for reaching consensus.  
However, dissenting opinion is not encouraged in the forums.100 If there is a 
participant who has dissenting opinion, an effort will be made to convince 
him/her. The party line adds its own impact for this. The opinion of the majority 
prevails over any dissenting opinion. This is known as “consensus dialogue”. 
The other issue is the effect of the decision. The decision is binding on both 
sides: the participating state and the absent state/s. The minutes of the forum is 
sent to all regions the next day. After setting out a strategy and action plan, the 
issue may be returned to all regional states for implementation. Failure to attend 
the IGR forum will not entail any consequence, and the decision is binding even 
in the absence of a given state.101 
6.1.2 Ministry of Federal Affairs  
The Ministry of Federal Affairs is the other federal body which has engaged in 
organizing IGR. It has established a section in charge of formalizing IGR. It has 
also organized IGR forums. The ministry is working toward the establishment of 
IGR sections within each federal ministry and its respective counterpart at 
regional bureaus.102 This is part of the pursuits of institutionalizing sector by 
sector intergovernmental interactions. The Ministry’s power of organizing IGR 
forums stems from its mandate and duties embodied in Proclamation No. 
691/2010. Pursuant to this legislation, the Ministry of Federal Affairs has the 
powers and duties to cooperate with concerned federal and regional state organs 
in maintaining public order.103  
Based on this mandate, the Ministry has organized a forum on peace and 
security. Participants of the forum are representatives of the federal and peace 
and security office heads of the regional states. Each region is represented by 
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three representatives.104 This forum is active in exchanging information and is 
backed by a memorandum of understanding which clearly defines the role of 
each level of government. Usually, they meet every three months to evaluate 
their performance, identify problems encountered and determine directions for 
future action.105 The forum is chaired by the federal government, and the states 
have the right to raise issues they think important to be discussed at the 
forum.106  
The second forum organized by the Ministry is the logical extension of the 
constitutional entitlement that requires government to provide special assistance 
to Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of the least advantaged in economic and 
social development.107 On behalf of the Federal government, the Ministry is 
authorized to provide assistance to regional states particularly to those regional 
states which deserve special support.108 Furthermore, the Ministry coordinates, 
integrates and follows up supports given by other federal organs to the regional 
states.109 There are also formal IGR forums which are organized by the federal 
special support board sector. Normally, this seems to involve a holistic form of 
support to enhance their capacity. They meet every three months at the head 
level and there are monthly meetings at the level of technical staff. The support 
of these technical experts ranges from capacity building to issues of how to plan, 
implement and report the same. 110 
The Ministry is also empowered to facilitate the resolution of disputes arising 
between regional states.111 In this regard, it is obliged to make sure that its acts 
are not prejudicial to the power of the House of Federation as stated in Articles 
48 and 62(6) of the Constitution.112 By virtue of Proclamation No. 610/2010, 
“the Ministry of Federal Affairs shall have the powers and duties to serve as a 
focal point in creating good federal-regional relationship and cooperation based 
on mutual understanding and partnership and thereby strengthening the federal 
system”.113 The Proclamation indicates the institution that serves as a focal point 
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to organize IGR.114 It also demands that the federal-state relationship should not 
be on the basis of hierarchy; rather, it should be on the basis of spirit of 
partnership and mutual understanding.115 As stated in the Proclamation, the 
overall objective of such relationship is to ensure “cooperation based on mutual 
understanding” and strengthen of the federal system.   
6.1.3 Sector by sector relationship  
In Ethiopia, virtually all ministries have their own family of intergovernmental 
mechanisms, and they have developed their own practice of cooperation and 
collaboration between the federal and regional governments. The structures, 
processes, and practices have been developed between different federal 
Ministries and their regional counterpart bureau in which all levels of 
government have a role. Thus, the Ministries of health, agriculture, education, 
trade and industry as well as regional sector bureaus have developed 
mechanisms and patterns to conduct intergovernmental relations that cover a 
wide range of functions. Although many of the concepts and functions are 
common across ministries, their roles and structures vary for a variety of 
reasons. The functions of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture 
highlighted below provide examples of intergovernmental processes in the 
context of a sector by sector coordination and harmonization.  
a) Ministry of Heath with Regional Health Bureaus  
The Ministry of Health has the power and duty to formulate the country's health 
sector development programmes and to follow up and evaluate the 
implementation of the same.116 It supports the expansion of health services 
coverage and follows up and coordinates the implementation of health programs 
financed by foreign assistance and loans.117 The Ministry is also responsible to 
direct, coordinate and follow up the implementation of the country's health 
information system.118 
Consistent with this mandate, the Ministry of Health is working with regional 
bureaus on prevention and control of diseases as well as availing health services 
for the public.119 The Ministry and the concerned regional bureaus have signed a 
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memorandum of understanding which strengthens their collaboration.120 This 
document is expected to serve as a legal base for their interaction and 
cooperation.121 There is a regular meeting which is held every two months at the 
level of high officials. The participants in this forum are top management 
(council) of the Ministry and regional bureau heads under the chairmanship of 
Ministry of Health.122 In this case too, there are states who fail to attend the 
meeting even though they are bound by the decision of the forum, irrespective 
of their non-appearance.123 This forum is supported by a technical committee 
which is called Federal Ministry of Health and Regional Health Bureaus Joint 
Steering Committee (shortly abbreviated as FMOH-RHB).124 
The committee collects information from each regional health bureau and 
identifies areas of priority. Based on the information gathered from each region, 
the committee identifies the common concerns of all the regions that should be 
discussed on the forum.125 The committee also identifies regions which need 
capacity building, financial support and experience sharing.126 
Experts move to these regions to supervise their overall performance and 
provide appropriate technical support with a view to scaling up the performance 
of the regional states. These experts examine the overall performance the 
regional states and offer recommendations.  Each region is expected to undertake 
its activities in accordance with the recommendations of the experts.  Pursuant 
to this, each region prepares and submits its report both to its respective regional 
council and to the Ministry every month.  
However, there are some states that delay their reports to the Ministry. In 
such cases, the state in default of reporting is notified to submit its report as 
soon as possible. If it fails to do so, this will be communicated to the Minister 
and the latter will write a letter, to which the regional states will instantly 
respond. The issue worth inquiring at this juncture is whether the regional states 
are obliged to submit a report to the Ministry?  Failure of regional states to 
submit their report timely will be a ground to be evaluated by the federal 
government127 as if they are accountable to the federal government. This 
approach seriously erodes the spirit of partnership and mutual confidence that 
would be created otherwise between the tiers of governments.  
                                           
120 Ibid.  
121 Cited as a legal basis to institutional IGR forums.  




125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid.  
362                               MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 9, No.2                              December 2015  
 
 
b) Ministry of Agriculture with regional agriculture Bureaus 
Like the other ministerial offices, the federal Ministry of Agriculture has both 
formal and informal relationships with regional agriculture bureaus. The 
informal mechanisms include communication through letters, telephone and also 
video conferences. The formal mechanism involves the forums that are 
frequently held.   
Activities that jointly engage the Ministry of Agriculture and regional 
agriculture bureaus include agricultural extension, natural resource and livestock 
development programs.128 The strategic oversight committee which follows up 
such joint engagements is composed of representatives from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, regional Agriculture Bureau and donors.129 These stakeholders 
together identify areas of priority and jointly prepare an annual plan derived 
from the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). The project has its own 
manual. The plan contains the respective roles of both levels of government.130 
This joint plan and program is evaluated every three months’.131 After six 
months, each region is expected to submit its report to the Ministry.  
There could also be other meetings (held twice a year) comprised of higher 
officials, experts and donors.132 The agenda is set by federal government 
experts. Here also, the role of the regional governments is limited to taking part 
in the meeting. Each meeting is chaired by the federal government officials, and 
head of agriculture bureau of the regional state –which serves as the venue of 
the meeting– becomes deputy chairperson.133  The federal government might 
take the forum as an opportunity to influence the agenda in favour of the federal 
government’s areas of priority.  
According to an opinion communicated to this author, it is the federal 
ministry that prepares the project and looks for funds, and that is why the federal 
government wants to have a tight control and hence chair the project.134 Even 
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though the federal government prepares the plan and organizes the platform for 
discussion, the regional governments have a significant role in developing the 
project proposal.135 The program is implemented in their respective regions and 
they are the actual actors in implementing the program. This gives them the 
opportunity to execute projects in their own context subject to submitting 
periodic reports regarding their performance. In case there are representatives of 
the regional governments who fail to attend the conference, they will be bound 
by the decision of the summit.136 
6.1.4  Political parties as a channel of intergovernmental relations in 
Ethiopia 
The dominant arrangement which has been employed by the federal government 
to ensure federal influence on states and guarantee uniform application of 
policies is the political party channel.  It can be argued that a disciplined party 
that dominates both levels of government is an asset for a divided country like 
Ethiopia. However, many writers consider this as an obstacle to a genuine 
federal structure.137 In practice, the hegemonic control of the party throughout 
Ethiopia is a problem.  
The interaction between the central ruling party and regional member and 
affiliate parties is characterized by what Paulos calls “patron-clientism”.138 
Regional parties are implementers of the policies adopted by the Ethiopian 
Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The ruling party has its 
own representatives in regional states. By directly communicating with these 
representatives, the federal government can monitor the implementation of 
federal policies, programs and plans in regional states, and to render assistance 
in the capacity building pursuits of the latter. This has led some to conclude that 
there is currently a de facto one party state. 139 
Although we can argue that EPRDF is a coalition of ethnic parties, and not a 
monolithic party, the total dominance of EPRDF at both levels of government in 
Ethiopia is obvious. This evokes the question as to what will happen if an 
opposition party manages to win elections at regional or federal level? In other 
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words, if an opposition party manages to win elections at regional a level and 
EPRDF wins at the federal level, some fear that the reasons for the collapse of 
the Soviet Union could be a prophesy to the Ethiopian federalism as well.140 
Hence, what are the mechanisms of dealing with centrifugal forces if they 
dominate the political space? As Bekele quoted in Alem argues, if EPRDF falls 
from power, the federation will wither away with it. Indeed, such fears are 
grounded, since each ethnic group has the weapon of secession. In fact, such 
threat is something confirmed by EPRDF itself in its series of party meetings.141 
One can anticipate a number of worst case scenarios. The collapse of the 
federation might be followed by civil war, military rule, or disintegration of the 
Ethiopian state. The potential for such negative scenarios calls for proactive 
strategic thinking and measures that can enhance cooperation, trust and 
harmony.  After a certain level of fragility, failed statehood may not stop at the 
level of a regional state or a zone but can go further down to the smallest 
demarcation point of ‘identity’ because at that stage denominations such as 
shared language and religion do not guarantee unity and peace as is the case in 
Somalia and other countries. While the Soviet Union scenario was 
fragmentation of the states, fragility and failed statehood can bring about 
scenarios that are even worse. 
One of the areas that show potential danger of deadlock is the arrangement of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer. By African standards, regional officials in 
Ethiopia are less confident to challenge the federal government on constitutional 
grounds.142 Despite a single party dominance, however, we have witnessed 
serious debates in the House of Federation (HoF) in matters of fiscal transfer. In 
this case, Solomon‘s analysis of the potential tension of revenue secession in 
light of the experiences of other countries is worth mentioning.143 In settings of 
different parties controlling regional states, there could be serious inter-ethnic 
party conflict on these issues.  
The 2001 Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) crisis, as many writers 
observed, is illustrative of the fragile nature of the federation in general and the 
status of intergovernmental relations in particular.144 EPRDF itself, as stated in 
its series of party meetings, appeared to have been shocked and took subsequent 
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measures, which were seen by some as implementing the constitutional 
provisions to fill the existing gaps and by some as extra-constitutional 
centralization of power. Some of the notable steps taken were the creation of 
federal police force in the regions, replacement of delegated court structure with 
dual court structure, the creation of Ministry of Federal affairs, and passage of a 
proclamation for federal intervention into the regions; at one point EPRDF had 
announced its intentions to transform the ethnic based parties into nationwide 
parties.145 
In the midst of such challenges, Tom Patz saw phenomena which emerged 
from the 2001 party crisis, such as the rise in the self-confidence and self-
assurance of regional states as well as the formation of several committees, 
work groups and coordination mechanisms.146 He advises states to understand 
the inherent complexities of a federal system and to learn how to manage and 
solve conflicts by developing the culture of dialogue and consensus building. 
Thus, institutionalized intergovernmental relations will enable participation and 
consensus building on matters of shared functions. This may avoid blackmail 
and conspiracy by some regional parties to manipulate ethnic identity for 
particular purposes.  
6.2 IGR and its implication on state autonomy in Ethiopia 
Hundreds of meetings each year, uncountable informal contacts, a varied and 
complex intergovernmental cooperation are the nature of intergovernmental 
relations in Ethiopia today.147 The increasing number of multilateral and 
bilateral intergovernmental agreements and partnerships indicate the inter-
governmental activities in all policy areas. With the shift to the signing of 
several intergovernmental agreements and pressure for policy and administrative 
collaboration, one might expect significant changes both in the formal 
intergovernmental machinery and informal interactions.  However, there has 
been little examination of the implications of such changes of formal 
intergovernmental machinery or of informal intergovernmental networks on the 
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6.2.1 Institutionalization Process  
The absence of an independent institution that is in charge of consolidating IGR 
leads to lack of regularity and continuity of interactions. For instance, some 
institutions make intergovernmental relation twice a year and others make it 
three times a year. Unless the regional government requests the assistance of the 
federal government, the forums are organized based on the schedule of the 
federal government and when the federal government deems it necessary to 
disseminate some lesson/information for the federation units.  Or, it may take 
place when there is some urgent matter that the federal government desires to 
implement throughout the country or if there are national issues of sufficient 
substance to warrant a meeting. 
The other point that needs consideration is requesting all regional states to 
participate in the meeting. Even more, representatives of all regional states are 
expected to participate on the IGR forums without inquiring whether the agenda 
only concerns a particular state or not.148 Had it not been for the absence of 
formal institutions in charge of IGR, all federation-units would not have been 
called for IGR dialogues on every issue/matter. A federal ministry writes a letter 
to its counterpart as if the latter is subordinate to the former. This results in the 
development of unwanted hierarchical relationship between the two. 
Unconstructive cultures of superior-subordinate interaction freezes a spirit of 
partnership and erodes the autonomy of the states. 
Moreover, the existence of a dominant political party system and the 
overriding mode of interaction between federal and state relations through the 
party channel undermine the establishment of formal institutional frameworks. 
As a result, formal intergovernmental relations are ultimately placed within the 
domains of party channel interactions thereby influencing the operation of the 
same. This continues to pose a challenge to the stability and integrity of formal 
intergovernmental relationships in the Ethiopian federation.149 Furthermore, the 
level of horizontal intergovernmental relations is even much underdeveloped, 
with the exception of informal cooperation of few regional states.150  
6.2.2  The role and power balance of the two tiers of government  
Despite some sections of the Constitution that suggests non-hierarchal 
relationship between the federal and regional states, in Ethiopia, what exists is a 
top-down federal system. The federal government has wide range of powers to 
                                           
148  It can also be argued that the participation of all states may have the advantage of 
creating the chance for experience sharing, they may contribute in generating innovative 
solutions, and learning from the forum they may also take necessary preventive measures 
to make sure that the same problem would not occur in their territory. 
149 Assefa Fiseha (2009), supra note 11. 
150 Assefa Fiseha (2006), supra note 35, p. 274. 
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undermine regional plans, and to intervene in regional administrations. Regional 
governments have not developed a strong sense in considering themselves as 
independent political actors. It appears that many inter-governmental meetings 
are dominated by federal government priorities.  
One drawback of the current structures of IGR at the level of federal-state 
relations is that it is defined and practiced in ‘hierarchical terms’. There is a 
clear top-down approach while the federal government is dealing with regional 
states in several matters. The state governments, both in terms of personnel and 
in the nature of responsibility, are less equipped compared to that of the federal 
government. Most of the time, it is the federal government which takes the 
lion’s share in agenda-setting and organizing IGR forums.151 Besides, it is the 
federal government which chairs most of the conferences. All these verify that it 
is a hierarchical relation rather than equality that has been a key feature of IGR 
in Ethiopia. 
6.2.3 The invisible obligation to submit periodic reports 
Regional government officials are required to submit periodic reports on their 
performance. Their achievements are evaluated under the chairmanship of the 
federal government officials. These officials give feedback and direction about 
things that can/should be done and on the way forward. This may extend to the 
reporting of the inefficiency of the regional representatives to the regional 
government president’s office which may result in the removal of the person in 
charge of the office. This undoubtedly amounts to eroding the autonomy of the 
regions and systematic reshuffling of the regional state officials. This is against 
the constitutional integrity of the regional states.  
Concluding Remarks  
Intergovernmental relation is important in installing the culture of negotiation, 
checking the centralization of government power, and enhancing the bargaining 
power of the regional states. Establishment of permanent forums for 
intergovernmental bond has a crucial role in negotiation, non-hierarchical 
exchange of information as well as facilitation of cooperation between the 
institutions of the two levels of government.  
Regarding institutional framework of IGR in Ethiopia, the House of 
Federation invokes a constitutional basis to organize IGR. At the same time the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs invokes certain legislation as its legal basis to 
organize IGR. The third category of interaction which has been practiced uses 
intergovernmental agreement as a legal basis for organizing IGR. This is usually 
described as sector by sector interaction which is backed by the signing of 
                                           
151 Id., p. 391.  
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memorandum of understanding. This document serves as a legal base to make 
their interaction formal.  
Therefore, establishing an appropriate legal framework is essential to 
optimize the benefits of intergovernmental relationship. This legal framework 
must contain detail principles of cooperation in the course of concurrent or 
overlapping responsibilities. An independent institution should be established 
whose mandate is mainly to organize IGR on shared programs. Federations are 
expected to respond both to central priorities and to regional and local priorities; 
and each negotiation should be done on the spirit of partnership and equality 
rather than hierarchy.  
Neutrality of the institution facilitates the coequality of the two tiers of 
government. The House of federation seems the appropriate institution to 
organize IGR in light of the participation of the regional governments in the 
House. Second, the House has constitutional mandate to organize IGR. If the 
existing dependence on the executive line remains unchanged, the focal point 
for IGR should be the prime-minister’s office owing to its enhanced opportunity 
to give binding decisions and its ability to control the execution of decisions. 
A federal government interacts and collaborates with a regional government 
either individually or jointly. Therefore, a given state should be expected to 
attend IGR forums only if the matter concerns it. Otherwise, it is unnecessary to 
demand and oblige every regional state to partake on the issue that does not add 
substantial value to its interests and concerns. The role of invited guests in IGR 
forums should also be sufficiently defined. The IGR forums are basically meant 
to coordinate the policies of the federal and the regional states on the shared 
programs. The federal government and the state governments identify their role 
on the program and reach a consensus. The role of invited guests should thus be 
limited to giving opinion rather having a say same as the stakeholders, i.e. 
federal and regional government representatives.                                                ■ 
                                                              
 
